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Neuropsychologists are increasingly called upon to conduct evaluations with 
individuals involved in personal injury litigation.  While the inclusion of malingering 
measures within a test battery may help clinicians determine whether a client has put 
forth full effort, attorney coaching may allow dishonest clients to circumvent these 
efforts.  The purpose of this study was to determine the degree to which frequently used 
measures of effort are susceptible to coaching as well as to explore and classify strategies 
undertaken by coached analogue malingerers.  Additionally, potential improvements in 
the external validity of the simulation design were explored.  





Approximately 94% of neuropsychologists in private practice report involvement 
in personal injury evaluations of brain-injury cases (Essig, Mittenberg, Petersen, 
Strauman, & Cooper, 2001).  During these personal injury evaluations, the 
neuropsychologist evaluates cognitive functioning across a wide domain of abilities; 
however, before making a conclusion of compromised functioning secondary to injury, 
the neuropsychologist must ensure that the patient has put forth his or her best effort 
towards the testing procedures (Iverson, 2003).  The fabrication or exaggeration of 
cognitive impairment in the presence of some incentive (i.e., financial compensation) is 
particularly germane to the forensic examiner as malingering is an increasingly costly 
issue.  Malingering accounts for nearly one-fifth of all medical care cases (i.e., doctor 
visits, hospitalizations) within the United States and combined medical and legal costs 
approach five billion dollars annually (Ford, 1983; Gouvier, Lees-Haley, & Hammer, 
2003). 
Estimated baserates of malingering range from approximately 18% to 33% of 
litigating populations (Binder, 1993; Heaton, Smith, Lehman, & Vogt, 1978; Mittenberg, 
Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 2002), therefore the need for accurate detection methods is 
clear.  To respond to this need, numerous malingering detection techniques have been 
developed.   A recent survey revealed that 79% of neuropsychologists involved in 
personal injury cases incorporate techniques and methods designed to detect malingering 
into their neuropsychological battery (Slick, Tan, Strauss, & Hultsch, 2004).  Some of the 
most frequently employed techniques include symptom validity testing, examination of 




the performance curve, examination of floor effects, recognition of atypical 
performances, and the use of validity indices.   
Malingering Detection Methods 
Symptom Validity Testing 
Symptom validity tests (SVT) allow a clinician to infer a patient’s intent to 
deceive (Bianchini, Mathias, & Greve, 2001). Within a SVT, a specific ability is assessed 
by a large number of items presented in multiple-choice format (Rogers, 1997).  The 
patient’s performance is then compared to the likelihood of success based on chance 
alone.  For example, on a measure that consists of two items from which the patient must 
choose, the patient could theoretically answer 50% of the items correctly based on chance 
alone (Haines & Norris, 1995).  The assumption behind forced-choice measures is that if 
a subject scores significantly below chance at a p < .05 level, there is the presence of 
purposive distortion, that is, the patient deliberately chose to respond with the incorrect 
answer (Reynolds, 1998).   
Numerous variations of the SVT technique have been developed to increase 
parameters of sensitivity and specificity to malingering detection, but no approach has 
proven successful at doing both simultaneously. Within the context of malingering 
detection, a measure’s sensitivity refers to its ability to recognize malingering in 
individuals who actually are malingering and specificity is the ability of the test to render 
a negative finding in individuals who are not malingering.  Utilization of a cutoff score is 
one way to improve a measure’s sensitivity; however, at the cost of reduced specificity.  
A cutoff score represents the lowest score achieved by an individual with documented 
brain dysfunction who has no financial incentive to perform poorly.  Therefore, if a 




patient with minor, or no documented brain-injury performs significantly worse than this 
cutoff score, malingering should be suspected (Haines & Norris, 1995).  The addition of 
cutoff scores to the SVT paradigm made it so that it was no longer necessary to rely on 
scores significantly below chance to indicate poor motivation, now less extreme scores 
could be used, thus improving the sensitivity of this method (Rogers, 1997). 
 There are numerous tests employing the SVT technique, each with varying 
stimulus presentations and organizations.  For example, The Test of Memory 
Malingering (TOMM), the most frequently used SVT among practicing clinicians, 
utilizes a visual presentation with the intent of tapping into malingered memory 
difficulties (Slick et al., 2004; Tombaugh, 1997).  Published psychometric properties of 
this test with coached simulator samples include 100% specificity and sensitivity rates 
when using an empirically derived cutoff score of less than 45, and 100% specificity and 
40% sensitivity when using below chance performance of less than 18 (Tombaugh, 
1997).  The Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT), another SVT, employs a visual 
recognition task where a respondent is asked to remember a five-digit number.  
Respondents to this measure generally perceive that the measure’s difficulty varies as a 
function of an incorporated distractor task.  Perceived task difficulty has been associated 
with increased symptom exaggeration among malingerers.  Published sensitivities of the 
PDRT range from 15% when using an empirically derived cutoff score of less than 19 for 
“easy” items, to 26% for a cutoff score of less than 18 for “hard” items, and to 30% for a 
cutoff score of less than 39 for “easy” and “hard” items combined.  The specificity when 
using these cutoff scores remained strong at 100% across all three indices (Binder, 1993).   




Computerized tests employing the SVT technique are also available.  For 
example, the Computerized Assessment of Response Bias (CARB) is a measure that is 
gaining increased use among neuropsychologists (Slick et al., 2004).  Published reports 
of the CARB indicate an 87.2% correct classification rate in analogue malingerers (Allen, 
Iverson, & Green, 2002).  In addition, reports on The Word Memory Test (WMT), 
another computerized test with a SVT component, indicate that this measure has the 
strongest sensitivity and specificity of all computerized malingering tests, at 97.7% and 
100% respectively (Green, Lees-Haley, & Allen, 2002); however, some dispute these 
numbers citing inflation due to a large proportion of defense referrals within the sample 
(Bigler, 2006). 
Performance Curve 
  Another technique frequently used in the assessment of effort is the performance 
curve.  The performance curve compares the probability of correctly answering easy 
items versus more difficult items (Rogers, 1997).  In individuals who are providing full 
effort, the clinician should expect to see a decrease in correct responding as task 
difficulty increases.  Evidence has shown that simulated malingerers do not generate the 
typical performance curve, that is they fail a “more-than-expected” proportion of easy 
items compared to their performance on more difficult items (Frederick & Foster, 1991).  
 A measure that relies on the performance curve is the Dot Counting Test (DCT).  
This measure presents stimuli of varying (and mixed up) difficulty levels to determine the 
consistency of an individual’s response time and error-rate (Lezak, 1995).  In non- 
malingering subjects, typically no errors are committed and a positive correlation is 
observed between difficulty level and time to respond.  If there is more than one 




pronounced discrepancy between the expected and observed patterns of response time 
and/or if more than 2 errors are made, malingering should be suspected. Overall, 
empirical evidence supports error-rate as the stronger indicator of malingering (Frederick, 
2002; Binks, Gouvier, & Waters, 1996).  
Floor Effects 
 There are many problems and tasks that are easily accomplished by most 
individuals, including those with brain damage.  Malingering detection utilizes this 
knowledge by examining floor effects.  Floor effects are extremely low performances 
observed when malingerers misjudge the difficulty of easy tasks and perform more 
poorly than brain-damaged patients (Millis & Kler, 1995).  A drawback to this method, 
however, is that it is sensitive to true memory impairment and correlates considerably 
with measures of cognitive competence (Vallabhajosula, & van Gorp, 2001; Lezak, 
1995). 
 The Rey-Fifteen Item Memory Test (MFIT) is a commonly used measure that 
utilizes the floor effect (Frederick, 2002).  This measure is sensitive to true memory 
impairment; therefore, the cutoff score is not fixed.  For comparison to non-clinical and 
psychiatric populations a cutoff score of 9 provides appropriate predictive accuracy; 
however, if a differential diagnosis of amnesia or dementia is suspected, a cutoff score of 
7 should be used (Goldberg & Miller, 1986; Bernard & Fowler, 1990; Frederick, 
Sarfarty, Johnston, & Powel, 1994; Lezak, 1983; Lee, Loring, & Martin, 1992).   
Atypical Test Performance 
 Test performance that is markedly discrepant from accepted models of normal 
and abnormal brain functioning alert the clinician to the possibility of exaggerated 




deficits.  For example, it is well documented that implicit memory is preserved following 
even the most severe brain-injuries (Kuzis, Sabe, Tiberti, Merello, Leiguarda, & 
Starkstein, 1999).  The theory behind this method is that the automatic and intentional 
uses of memory can be separated, and that “conscious control can be measured as the 
difference between performance when a person is trying to as compared with trying not 
to use information from some particular source” (Jacoby, 1991 p. 527).  Therefore, any 
impairment on measures of implicit learning may be indicative of malingering.  A 
measure that utilizes this concept is the Word Completion Memory Test (WCMT; 
Hilsabeck, LeCompte, Marks, & Grafman, 2001).  When using cutoff scores of less than 
15 on the Inclusion subtest and a cutoff score of less than 9 for the difference between the 
Inclusion and Exclusion subtests, the WCMT correctly classifies 97% of malingerers 
(Hilsabeck et al., 2001). 
Validity Indices 
 Many self-report measures of psychological functioning contain validity scales 
meant to detect if respondents are answering in a manner that invalidates the overall 
results.  More specifically, these scales can indicate the direction of invalidation.  For 
example, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) has at least two 
indices that can be used for malingering detection.  The F or “infrequency” scale 
measures the extent to which a person answers in an atypical and deviant manner.  A 
score of 70 or above is suggestive of possible malingering.  The Dissimulation or F-K 
index determines the likelihood and direction of exaggeration.  A score of 12 or greater 
indicates a fake bad profile, while a score of -12 or less indicates a fake good profile 
(Groth-Marnat, 1997).  Similarly, the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) contains 




scales appropriate for use in malingering detection.  The strongest indicator is the 
Negative Impression Management (NIM) scale that measures the degree to which an 
individual presented an exaggerated, unfavorable impression of distress.  A score of 92 or 
greater is indicative of possible malingering (Morey, 2003). 
Overall Classification of Malingered Performance 
 While failure on one or more measures of effort may alert the clinician to possible 
malingering, one must be cautious when declaring a patient as a malingerer.  In fact, 
41.7% of surveyed neuropsychologists reported only rarely using the term “malinger” in 
their reports (Slick et al., 2004).  Numerous reasons for this hesitation exist, including the 
fear of mislabeling someone, the likelihood of being threatened, or the possibility of 
being sued (Iverson, 2003).  Regardless of the reason, it has been recommended that the 
clinician employ a more systematic evaluation of malingering to ensure correct 
classification and to meet the stringent standards of evidence offered by Daubert.    
 The most thorough and systematic evaluation in the assessment of malingering 
comes from Slick, Sherman, and Iverson (1999).  Slick et al. (1999) defined malingering 
as “…the volitional exaggeration or fabrication of cognitive dysfunction for the purpose 
of obtaining substantial material gain, or avoiding or escaping formal duty or 
responsibility.” (p. 552).  Furthermore, the authors describe three categories of 
malingering, namely possible, probable, and definite, based on performance across 
different measures and techniques designed to detect malingering.  For a patient to 
classify into one of these categories some combination of four criteria is to be met.  The 
four criteria are: 




Criterion A: Presence of a substantial external incentive - at least one clearly 
identifiable and substantial external incentive is present at the time of examination. 
Criterion B: Evidence from neuropsychological testing - evidence of exaggeration 
or fabrication on neuropsychological tests as evidenced from at least one of the 
following: 
1.) Definite response bias - below chance performance (p<.05) on one or                                   
more forced-choice measures. 
2.) Probable response bias - performance on a well-validated test or index                                 
is consistent with fabrication or exaggeration. 
3.) Discrepancy between test data and known patterns of brain functioning. 
4.) Discrepancy between test data and observed behavior. 
5.) Discrepancy between test data and reliable collateral reports. 
6.) Discrepancy between test data and documented background history. 
Criterion C: Evidence from self-report - significant inconsistencies or 
discrepancies in a patient’s self-reported symptoms that suggest fabrication or 
exaggeration as evidenced by one of the following: 
1.) Self-reported history is discrepant with documented history. 
2.) Self-reported symptoms are discrepant with known patterns of brain 
functioning. 
3.) Self-reported symptoms are discrepant with behavioral observations. 
4.) Self-reported symptoms are discrepant with information obtained from 
collateral informants. 




5.) Evidence of exaggerated or fabricated psychological dysfunction - 
performance on well-validated validity scales or indices on self-report 
measures of psychological adjustment are strongly suggestive of 
exaggeration or fabrication. 
Criterion D: Behaviors meeting necessary criteria from groups B or C are not fully 
accounted for by Psychiatric, Neurological, or Developmental Factors - behaviors 
are the product of an informed, rational, and volitional effort aimed at least in part 
toward acquiring or achieving external incentives.   
To qualify as a definite malingerer, the patient must meet criteria A, B1, and D; 
meaning there must be substantial external incentive, the presence of a definite negative 
response bias on neuropsychological test(s), and no psychiatric, neurological, or 
developmental factor that would significantly diminish one’s capacity to appreciate laws 
or mores against malingering. 
 To qualify as a probable malingerer, the patient must meet criterion A, two or 
more from B1-B6, and D, or criterion A, one from B1-B6, one from C1-C5, and D.  
Therefore, a patient can classify as a probable malingerer in two ways, by having the 
presence of external incentive, two pieces of evidence from neuropsychological testing, 
and no psychiatric, neurological, or developmental disorder, or by having external 
incentive, one piece of evidence from neuropsychological testing, one piece of evidence 
from self-report, and no psychiatric, neurological, or developmental disorder. 
 There are also two ways in which a patient can qualify as a possible malingerer, 
the patient must either meet criterion A, one from C1-C5, and D, (external incentive, 
evidence from self-report, and no psychiatric, neurological, or developmental disorder) or 




must meet criteria that would classify him/her as a definite or probable malingerer with 
the exception of criterion D.  See Table 1. 
Malingering Strategies and Attorney Coaching 
 Few studies have looked at malingering strategies in individuals asked to perform 
as if they were head-injured.  Of the strategies reported in analogue malingerers, the most 
frequently used approach is to feign total memory loss (76%), followed by feigning a 
slow rate of response speed (32%), confusion (16%), and concentration difficulty (12%) 
(Tan, Slick, Strauss, & Hultsch, 2002).  Importantly, however, these strategies were 
observed in individuals naïve to the effects of head-injury and/or the likelihood of 
detection by effort measures.  It is likely that these approaches may be different in “real-
world” malingerers as individuals involved in personal injury litigation may be coached 
by their attorneys on the sequelae of brain damage and also in ways to avoid detection.  
Elucidating the strategies employed by coached malingerers may help to inform the 
clinician about possible methods in which coached malingerers attempt to avoid 
detection.   
 Approximately 75% of attorneys recently surveyed reported preparing their 
clients for forensic neuropsychological evaluations by discussing the content and purpose 
of neuropsychological tests and measures (Essig et al., 2001).  Furthermore, there is 
evidence that attorneys brief their clients on the inclusion of measures designed to detect 
malingering.  The most frequently reviewed test is the MMPI-2 (29%), followed by the 
PDRT (6%), and the MFIT(2%).  In addition to direct warnings of neuropsychological 
and effort measures, approximately 10% of attorneys inform their clients of what types of 
information to disclose concerning their injury and 12% tell their clients what  




Table 1    
 
Criteria and Classification of Malingered Neurocognitive Dysfunction of Slick, 
Sherman, & Iverson (1999). 
 
Criterion A:  Presence of a Substantial External Incentive    
Criterion B:  Evidence from Neuropsychological Testing 
Criterion C:  Evidence from Self-Report 
Criterion D:  Behaviors are not fully accounted for by Psychiatric, Neurological, or          
Developmental Factors 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Classification           Criterion A          Criterion B          Criterion C          Criterion D 
 
Definite malingering         X            X*      (X)    X 
              
 
Probable malingering          X                         X                                                          X 
           (two pieces) 
   Or         
 
Probable Malingering         X                          X                        X                              X            
             (one piece)     (one piece) 
 
Possible Malingering          X                                                     X                              X 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
*Must Include Definite Negative Response Bias 




information not to disclose (Essig et al., 2001).  The influence of attorney coaching on 
neuropsychological performance and malingering detection measures is likely to 
influence and invalidate the standard neuropsychological assessment.  
 Recent studies have examined the susceptibility of effort measures to attorney 
coaching; however, the results have generally been mixed.  For example, Suhr and 
Gunstad (2000) reported that providing simulated malingerers with brain-injury 
information had no effect on their performance on the Auditory Verbal Learning Test.  
Similarly, a computerized version of the PDRT was found to be resilient to coaching 
(Rose, Hall, Szalda-Petreem, & Bach, 1998).  The WCMT was also found to be 
invulnerable to the effects of coaching; however, this measure was designed specifically 
against coaching effects (Hilsabeck et al., 2001). 
In contrast, others have reported on the vulnerability to coaching of many 
measures of effort.  Lamb, Berry, Wetter, and Baer (1994) demonstrated the 
susceptibility of the MMPI-2 to both coaching and brain-injury information.  Simulated 
malingerers, who were provided with information regarding brain-injury and/or 
information regarding the ability of the MMPI-2 to detect a “fake-bad” profile, produced 
valid profiles with significantly elevated clinical scales similar to those obtained by 
individuals with true head injuries.  In addition, Martin, Bolter, Todd, and Gouvier (1993) 
reported that analogue malingerers were able to produce more believable profiles on a 
computerized forced-choice measure after being provided with information regarding 
dissimulation.  More believable profiles were also observed on the CARB and WMT 
after participants were provided with information on how to beat these measures (Dunn, 
Shear, Howe, & Ris, 2003).  Similar results were observed on the Nonverbal Forced 




Choice Test, 21-Item Test, DCT, MFIT, PDRT, and Recognition Memory Test (Rose et 
al., 1998; Cato, Brewster, Ryan, & Guiliano, 2002; Gunstad & Suhr, 2001; Martin, 
Hayes, & Gouvier, 1996).  
Although numerous studies have examined the vulnerability of effort measures to 
coaching, no study has compared frequently used measures of malingering against one 
another to determine which are relatively more or less vulnerable to coaching.  In 
addition, no study to date, has examined the profile of malingering strategies utilized by 
individuals who have been coached.  The purpose of this study is to determine which 
commonly used measures of effort are most susceptible to the effects of coaching as well 
as to determine what malingering strategies are most frequently employed by individuals 
who are coached.  However, before these questions can be answered, methodological 
issues in malingering research must be addressed.   
Methodological Issues in Malingering Research 
The vast majority of malingering research is based on the simulation design.  This 
design utilizes non-clinical subjects, typically university undergraduates, asked to feign 
brain damage. Although one recent study (Brennan & Gouvier, 2006) has shown that 
simulated malingerers are comparable to actual malingerers, studies utilizing the 
simulation design have historically been criticized for their lack of generalizability to 
actual malingerers.  A particular concern of the simulation design is that the individuals 
employed have little to no experience regarding head-injury.  This is considerably 
different from individuals involved in actual litigation.  Often times, litigants who are 
malingering may have experienced and recovered from a mild head-injury; however, they 
choose to perform during the neuropsychological evaluation as if their deficits were still 




present (Rogers, 1997).  It is possible that the prior experience of an actual head-injury 
allows the litigant to malinger in a more convincing manner (Cato et al., 2002).  Past 
research has demonstrated that simulated malingerers with a history of head-injury 
perform differently than simulators without the history of a head-injury, although 
experience with head-injury does not reliably reduce misconceptions about head-injury, 
still leaving the once-injured malingerer vulnerable to detection (Ju & Varney, 2000; 
Martin, Hayes, & Gouvier, 1995). 




Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to determine which commonly used measures of 
effort are most susceptible to the effects of coaching as well as to determine what 
malingering strategies are most frequently employed by individuals who are coached on a 
variety of brain injury sequelae.  Before these questions can be answered, methodological 
issues in malingering research are addressed.   
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Question 1 
Several tests and measures have been developed to detect malingering.  
Which commonly used measures of malingering are most susceptible to 
coaching? 
Hypothesis 1:  It predicted that providing participants with 
information regarding a test’s ability to detect malingering as well 
as information regarding brain-injury sequelae will lessen the 
severity of performance failures on the TOMM, PDRT, WMT, 
DCT, MFIT, and PAI.  Furthermore, it is predicted that the 
influence of coaching will be observed through increased failure 
rates on the WCMT. 
Question 2 
Malingering strategies in uncoached simulated malingerers have been 
well documented (Tan et al., 2002).  What strategies do coached 
simulators commonly employ? 




Hypothesis 2:  It is predicted that strategies employed by 
uncoached simulated malingerers will be significantly different 
from strategies employed by coached simulated malingerers. 
 Question 3   
  Are individuals with a history of head-injury better able to simulate  
  brain damage compared to individuals without a history of head-injury?  
Hypothesis 3:  It is predicted that less severe performance failures 
will be observed in simulated malingerers with a history of head-
injury compared to individuals without a history of head-injury. 
   






 A power analysis was performed to determine the number of subjects needed for 
power = .80 and alpha = .05.  A large effect size was consistently observed in reviews of 
the literature on differences between coached and uncoached simulators and therefore, a 
large effect size was assumed to occur in this study.  Using an effect size of 1.25σ, 20 
subjects per group were estimated to yield enough power to find a true difference if one 
really exists (Cato et al., 2002; Gunstad & Suhr, 2001); however, data was collected from 
substantially more participants yielding a total sample size of 131.   
 Participants were 131 undergraduate students attending Louisiana State 
University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  Participation was on a volunteer basis with six 
extra credit points awarded for participation.  All participants were recruited from 
undergraduate courses and were randomly assigned to received coached instructions or 
uncoached instructions.   The distribution of participants in each group was as follows: 
Coached & History of Head Injury (C/HI): n = 20; Coached & No History of Head Injury 
(C/NHI): n = 41; Not Coached & History of Head Injury (NC/HI): n = 20; Not Coached 
and No History of Head Injury (NC/NHI): n = 50.  Individuals were assigned to the HI 
group if they had endorsed experiencing a concussion or any loss of consciousness in 
their initial interview. 
 The entire sample was composed of 47 males and 84 females.  The average age of 
the sample was 20.90 years (SD = 3.45) and the average level of education was 13.40 
years (SD = 2.68).  The sample was 80.9% Caucasian, 16% African-American, .8% 
Hispanic, 1.5% Asian, and .8% of the sample described their race as “other.”  No 




significant differences were observed between the C and NC groups on variables of age 
[(C: M = 20.64, SD = 2.46; UC: M = 21.13, SD = 4.13) t (129) = -.80, p = .42], 
educational level [(C: M = 13.84, SD = 1.26; UC: M = 13.03, SD = 3.44) t (89.23) = 1.83, 
p = .071], ethnicity [(C: 80.3% Caucasian, 16.4% African-American, 1.6% Hispanic, and 
1.6% Asian; UC: 81.4% Caucasian, 15.7% African-American, and 2.9% Other) U = 
2110.50, p = .86], or gender [(C: 41% male; UC: 31.4% male) U = 1931.00, p = .25].  
Similarly, no significant differences were observed between the HI and NHI groups on 
age [(HI: M = 21.25, SD = 3.85; NHI: M = 20.75, SD = 3.27) t (129) = .76, p = .44], 
educational level [(HI: M = 13.20, SD = 3.24; NHI: M = 13.49, SD = 2.41) t (129) = -.57, 
p = .56], ethnicity [(HI: 75.0% Caucasian, 17.5% African-American, 2.5% Hispanic, and 
2.5% Asian; NHI: 83.5% Caucasian, 15.4% African-American, and 1.1% Other) U = 
1647.50, p = .20], or gender [(HI: 47.5% male; NHI: 30.8% male) U = 1515.50, p = .06].  
See Table 2. 
Materials 
 Written informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to their 
inclusion in the study.  The following tests were administered: 
Structured Clinical Interview 
A structured clinical interview was developed to obtain the following information 
from participants: age, gender, race, education, neurological history, history of 










Demographic Information Across Groups. 
 
                                                                        Mean  Standard Deviation    
Coached/Head-Injury 
 Age     20.80   2.69 
 Education    13.70   1.08 
Coached/No Head Injury 
 Age     20.56   2.37  
 Education    13.90   1.34 
Uncoached/Head Injury 
 Age     21.70   4.78 
 Education    12.70   4.45    
Uncoached/No Head Injury 
 Age     20.90   3.87 
 Education    13.16   2.99 
All Numbers Are Reported in Years




Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) 
The TOMM consists of two learning trials and a retention trial.  The two learning 
trials each consist of two phases, a study phase and a test phase.  The study 
portion of each trial contains 50 pictures presented one at a time for three seconds 
each.  During the test portion, the participant must decide between two pictures, 
one of which he previously studied.  Following a 20 minute delay, the retention 
trial is administered.  The retention trial only consists of the test phase.  A score of 
one point is credited for every correct answer.  The TOMM was administered 
according to manualized instructions (Tombaugh, 1996).  
Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT) 
During the PDRT, the examinee reads aloud a five-digit number string.  After a 
delay, the participant must visually choose, between two five-digit number 
strings, which number was originally presented.  This test is composed of easy 
items and hard items.  During the easy items, the participant is asked to count 
aloud for five seconds during the delay for the first 18 items, and then the delay is 
increased to 10 seconds for the second presentation of 18 items.  For the hard 
items, the participant is requested to count aloud for 30 seconds for two trials of 
18 items.  The PDRT was administered according to manualized instructions.  See 
Appendix B. 
Word Memory Test (WMT) 
The WMT is a computer-administered test.  Instructions are presented on the 
computer, prior to administration of the test.  A 20-item word list is presented.  
The words appear in pairs, with one word presented, followed by its pair one 




second later.  The pair disappears and another set is presented two seconds later.  
The entire word list is presented twice and then the participant is asked to recall as 
many of the word pairs as possible (Green et al., 2002).  The WMT provides three 
measures of effort.  The first measure is the immediate recognition trial (IR), 
where the subject is required to choose a word from the original list in each of 40 
new word pairs.  Following a 30-minute delay, the delayed recognition trial (DR) 
is administered.  It is nearly identical to the immediate recognition trial, except 
different foil words are presented. A consistency score (CNS) is calculated based 
on performances on the IR and DR trials.     
Memory for Fifteen Items Test (MFIT) 
The MFIT consists of 15 items that are arranged in three columns by five rows.  
Participants are shown a card containing 15 items for a 10 second duration.  
Following the 10 seconds, the card is removed and participants are asked to 
reproduce the 15 items from memory. One point is awarded for each item 
correctly reproduced.  The MFIT was administered according to manualized 
instructions (Lezak, 1995). See Appendix C. 
Dot Counting Test (DCT) 
The DCT consists of twelve cards with grouped and ungrouped dots printed on 3 
x 5 cards. The participant is told to count the dots as quickly as possible.  
Response times are compared to response times of samples of normal subjects and 
samples of brain-injured patients.  The DCT was administered according to 
manualized instructions (Lezak, 1995). See  
Appendix D. 




Word Completion Memory Test (WCMT) 
The WCMT consists of two subtests, Inclusion and Exclusion.  During the 
Inclusion subtest, 30 words are read aloud to the participant and the participant is 
asked to copy down the word and rate its pleasantness.  Following this, the 
participant is asked to complete 30 word stems using words from the previous list.  
During the Exclusion subtest the patient copies and rates a second list of 30 
words.  The participant is then asked to complete 30 word stems using words that 
were not on the list.  Performance on this test yields an I-score, which is the 
number of stems completed with words from the Inclusion list, an E-score, which 
is number of stems completed from words on the Exclusion list, and a R-score, 
which is the difference between the I and E scores.   
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) 
 The PAI consists of 344 statements on which a participant can answer as False, 
Slightly True, Mainly True, or Very True.   The completed form is entered into a 
computerized scoring program that provides a printout containing scores on 4 
validity scales and 9 clinical scales.   
Wide Range Achievement Test- Third Edition (WRAT-3) 
The reading subtest of WRAT-3 was administered to all participants to ensure at 
least a fourth grade reading level as required by the PAI.   
Strategy Questionnaire 
A questionnaire assessing the kind of strategies used by participants was 
rationally derived for this study using the published findings of Tan et al (2002).  
This questionnaire is comprised of questions regarding preparation for the 




experiment, strategy management, and perception of the face validity of each 
measure. This measure was read by the examiner with the test materials were 
represented so that the participant could properly rank the measures on the 
questionnaire.  See Appendix E. 
Subject Rating Scale 
A subject rating scale, taken directly from Tombaugh (1996), asked the questions: 
How successful do you think you were in your attempt to portray someone with a 
brain-injury? How hard did you try?  Subjects rate their answers on a 6 point 
Likert scale.  This measure was administered to control for those participants who 
reportedly did not try.  One participant was excluded from analyses for reporting 
on this measure that he did not try.  See Appendix F. 
Design and Procedure 
 This study occurred over two sessions.  During the first session, informed consent 
was obtained and the participant was interviewed using the structured clinical interview 
designed for this study.  Participants were then randomly assigned to the C or NC group 
as well as assigned an identification number to maintain anonymity of all responses.  All 
participants were read a set of instructions modified from Gunstad and Suhr (2001) and 
Cato et al. (2002).  Instructions were as follows: 
Imagine that you were in a car accident in which another driver hit your car.  You 
were knocked unconscious and woke up in the hospital.  You were kept overnight 
for observation.  The doctors told you that you experienced a concussion.  
Imagine that a year after the accident, you are involved in a lawsuit against the 
driver of the other car.  If you are found to have experienced significant injuries as 
a result of the accident, you are likely to receive a bigger settlement.  You have 
decided to fake or exaggerate symptoms of a brain-injury in order to increase the 
settlement you will receive.  As a part of the lawsuit, you are required to undergo 
cognitive testing to determine whether or not you have experienced a brain-injury.  
If you can successfully convince the examiner that you have experienced 




significant brain damage, you are likely to get a better settlement.  If the examiner 
detects that you are faking, you are likely to lose the lawsuit. 
 
In one week you will take a series of cognitive tests that will be used in such a 
situation.  I would like you to spend some time over the next week researching 
and developing your role as an individual with brain damage.  On the tests you 
will take next week, I would like you to simulate brain damage, but in a 
believable way, such that the examiner cannot tell that you are attempting to fake 
a brain-injury.     
 
Individuals assigned to the C group were read a second set of instructions which outlined 
multiple outcomes following brain-injury as well as the ability of some measures to 
detect malingering.  Instructions were as follows: 
 
I will read a list to you of commonly experienced problems following a head-
injury, which may help in your simulation of head-injury.  These symptoms 
include: frequent headaches, being easily fatigued, problems with memory, 
difficulty attending and concentrating, slowed responses, irritability, anxiety, and 
depression.  
 
Another piece of information that may help you in your simulation of head-injury 
is that some of the tests you will be given are designed to detect is someone is 
faking.  Your best chance of performing successfully will be to miss more of the 
difficult items that the easy ones and be sure not to miss more than half of the 
questions. 
 
Participants were then scheduled to undergo testing the following week.  The average 
length of time between Session 1 and 2 was 9.13 days (SD = 3.01).  There was no 
significant difference in length of time between sessions across the four groups, F (3, 68) 
= .60), p = .61.  Fifty-four students who completed Session 1 did not return for Session 2 
and were therefore excluded from the study, leaving a total sample size of 131.   
  During Session 2, the examiner reread the instructions presented during the first 
session.  Participants were then administered the two learning trials of the TOMM.  
During the delay, the MFIT and DCT were administered. Following the administration of 
the DCT, the retention trial of the TOMM was administered. Once the retention trial on 




the TOMM was complete, the PDRT and the WMT were administered.  During the 
WMT delay, participants were given an opportunity to take a break.  Following the 
completion of the WMT, participants were administered the WCMT, WRAT3, and PAI.    
Participants were then asked to complete the strategy questionnaire and subject rating 
scale.  Participants were then provided with an extra credit slip and dismissed.  
   






 A 2 x 2 between subjects MANOVA was used to test Hypotheses 1 and 3.   
In Hypothesis 1, it was predicted that performance failures of lesser severity would be 
observed in coached participants compared to uncoached participants on all measures  
except for the WCMT (in which case increased failure rates were predicted).  In  
Hypothesis 3, it was predicted that performance failures of lesser severity would be  
observed in simulated malingerers with a history of head-injury compared to simulators  
without a history of head-injury. Significance was considered at the p <.05 level. The  
independent variable was group classification (C versus NC and HI versus NHI) and the  
dependent variables were performance on 14 indices of effort derived from 7 measures,  
namely the TOMM Trial 1, TOMM Trial 2, TOMM Retention Trial, PDRT Easy, PDRT  
Hard, PDRT Total, WMT IR, WMT DR, WMT CNS, DCT errors, MFIT total, PAI NIM,  
WCMT I, and WCMT R.   
 Results for Hypothesis 1 demonstrate a significant main effect for the presence of  
coached instructions, meaning that there was a significant difference in the scores of  
participants who received coached instructions versus participants who did not, F (14,  
82) = 1.788, p <.05.  In contrast, no significant main effect was found for Hypothesis 3,  
meaning that participants with a history of head-injury did not perform significantly  
different than participants with no history of head-injury, F (14, 82) = .74, p = .72.  
Similarly, there was no significant interaction effect for history of head-injury and  
coached instructions, F (14, 82) = .40, p = .96.   




  Results of Bonnferoni post-hoc tests reveal significant differences between the C 
and NC groups on the TOMM Trial 1: F (1, 95) = 17.16, p <.05; TOMM Trial 2: F (1, 
95) = 11.29, p <.05; TOMM Retention Trial: F (1, 95) = 12.21, p <.05; PDRT Total: F 
(1, 95) = 3.84, p <.05; WMT DR: F (1, 95) = 10.43, p <.05; WCMT I: F (1, 95) = 8.63, p 
<.05; and WCMT R: F (1, 95) = 4.08, p <.05   See Table 3.  All significant differences 
were directional, with the C group demonstrating significantly better scores compared to 
NC group.  See Figure 1. With power = .88, the effect size was considered to be of 
medium strength, .50σ.   
 To test Hypothesis 2, that the strategies employed by coached simulators are 
significantly different from strategies employed by uncoached simulators, a 
nonparametric multiple-comparisons test, namely the Mann-Whitney U test, was used.  
The independent variable was group classification (C versus NC) and the dependent 
variable was frequency of employed strategies.  As no significant differences were 
observed in the HI and NHI groups in Hypothesis 3, this analysis of Hypothesis 2 was 
performed with the entire sample, collapsing across HI and NHI states.  Results indicate 
no significant differences between the C and NC groups in using the following 
malingering strategies: total memory loss, U = 1916.00, p = .30; slow rate of responding, 
U = 21430.50, p = .66; poor concentration U = 1991.00, p = .50; confusion U = 1840.00, 
p = .16; nervousness U = 2098.50, p = .85; dyslexia U = 1924.40, p = .32; and partial 
memory loss U = 2121.50, p = .95.  See Figure 1.  The most frequently used malingering 
strategies were poor concentration and partial memory loss followed by slow processing 
speed, confusion, nervousness, dyslexia, and total memory loss.   See Figure 2.   












TOMM 1* 30.17 (1.40) 38.38 (1.40) 
TOMM 2* 31.33 (1.70) 39.42 (1.70) 
TOMM R* 30.51 (1.75) 39.16 (1.75) 
MFIT Total 11.89 (.51) 13.19 (.51) 
DCT Errors 5.27 (.51) 4.04 (.51) 
PDRT Easy 20.04 (1.01) 22.74 (1.01) 
PDRT Hard 18.97 (.89) 21.13 (.89) 
PDRT Total* 38.91 (1.80) 43.91 (1.81) 
WMT IR 65.80 (14.91) 93.71 (14.92) 
WMT DR* 65.83 (3.13) 80.11 (3.13) 
WMT CNS 69.32 (2.87) 75.31 (2.87) 
WCMT I* 16.04 (.85) 19.58 (.85) 
WCMT R* 5.58 (1.46) 9.75 (1.46) 
PAI NIM 78.48 (3.60) 76.94 (3.60) 
* p <.05 





























Mean values of Malingering Strategies in Coached and Uncoached Simulators. 
 
*Scale based on 1 – 8, with 1 being most closely representative of the  participant’s 
strategy and 8 being least representative. 

























Modal Values of Malingering Strategies in Coached and Uncoached Simulators. 
 
*Scale based on 1 – 8, with 1 being most closely representative of the participant’s 
strategy and 8 being least representative. 
 
 




            All participants were asked to report on which test they believed (1) would catch 
someone who was trying to fake an injury; (2) was the easiest to fake an injury; (3) was 
the hardest to fake an injury; (4) was the most difficult to take; and (5) was the most 
aversive.  The PAI was most frequently reported by the C group as the test most likely to 
catch someone malingering whereas participants in the UC group reported the TOMM as 
the test most likely to detect malingering.  Both groups reported the TOMM as being the 
easiest test to fake a head-injury on and listed the PDRT as the hardest test to perform as 
if injured, the most difficult test to take, and as the most aversive test in the battery.  
 To ensure that participants complied with the request to perform as if they were 
head-injured, they were asked to rate their perceived level of success in portraying a 
head-injury as well as to gauge how hard they tried.  Individuals in the C group reported 
an average level of 2.43 and the UC group reported an average level of 2.50 (based on a 6 
point Likert scale: 0 = not at all, 5 = very) in rating their perceived level of success.  This 
difference was not significant, t (129) = .354, p = .724.  Similarly, no significant 
difference was observed on reported level of effort, t (129) = 1.581, p = .116.  Individuals 
in the C group endorsed trying at a level of 3.33 and individuals in the UC group reported 
trying at a level of 3.61.   
    





Nearly 75% of attorneys reported coaching their clients on the content and 
purpose of neuropsychological tests and measures prior to a forensic evaluation (Essig et 
al., 2001).  The frequency of coaching as well as the manner in which clients are coached 
can have potentially severe consequences for the ability of neuropsychological tests and 
measures to detect feigned or fabricated deficits.  Although numerous studies have 
examined the vulnerability of effort measures to coaching, no study has directly 
compared frequently used measures of effort against one another to determine which are 
relatively more or less vulnerable to coaching.  Furthermore, no study has examined the 
profile of malingering strategies utilized by individuals who have been coached.  
Examination of both the vulnerability of detection measures to coaching as well as the 
strategies utilized by individuals who are coached will help to prepare the clinician 
against efforts to avoid detection and thus ensure a more accurate neuropsychological 
assessment.   
The first purpose of this study was to determine which commonly used 
malingering measures are most susceptible to coaching.  To test this, simulated 
malingerers were provided with information regarding the typical head-injury sequelae as 
well as informed on the ability of neuropsychological and psychological tests to detect 
exaggeration or fabrication.  These simulated malingerers were then compared to 
simulators who did not receive such information.  It was hypothesized that coached 
simulators would demonstrate significantly less severe performance failures compared to 
the uncoached simulators.  Less severe scores were observed in the coached simulators 
on 13 of 14 indices, with 7 being statistically significantly better.   Furthermore, even the 




WCMT, a measure designed to be robust to the effects of coaching was vulnerable to 
coaching and significantly better in coached versus uncoached simulators.  
To determine which detection methods are more vulnerable to coaching, the 
measures used in this study were separated by the strategy on which they were based (i.e., 
SVT, floor effects, etc.)  Testing for atypical performance was most vulnerable to 
coaching, with coached samples passing 2 of 2 indices compared to the uncoached 
sample who failed both.  In addition, several of the symptom validity indices were found 
to be vulnerable.  Uncoached participants failed all 9 indices, whereas coached samples 
successfully passed 4 of 9 indices.   A test based on the performance curve was found to 
be invulnerable to coaching, with malingering in both the coached and uncoached 
samples detected.  Finally, tests utilizing validity indices as well as tests using floor 
effects were unable to detect malingering in either sample; therefore, coaching 
vulnerability of these measures could not be deciphered.   See Table 4.  
The specific measures that were vulnerable to coaching include the PDRT, the 
WMT Immediate Recall, and the WCMT.   Perhaps it was because, as Suhr and Gunstad 
(2000) suggested, coached individuals “suppressed their tendency to do devastatingly 
poorly on measures they perceived to be easy” (p. 402); however, both the coached and 
uncoached groups reported the PDRT as the most difficult and most aversive measure 
rather than the easiest.  In addition, when queried, neither group endorsed any of the 
above three measures as “most likely to catch someone faking.” In fact, the coached 
group listed the PAI as the test most likely to detect malingering compared to the TOMM 
which was reported in the uncoached sample.   






Performance Outcomes in Coached and Uncoached Simulators 
 
Method Uncoached Coached 
Symptom Validity Test   
TOMM 1* Fail Fail 
TOMM 2* Fail Fail 
TOMM R* Fail Fail 
PDRT Easy* Fail Pass 
PDRT Hard* Fail Pass 
PDRT Total* Fail Pass 
WMT IR Fail Pass 
WMT DR Fail Fail 
WMT CNS Fail Fail 
Performance Curve   
DCT Fail Fail 
Floor Effects   
MFIT Pass Pass 
Atypical Test Performance   
WCMT I Pass Pass 
WCMT R Fail Pass 
Validity Indices   
PAI NIM Pass Pass 
*based on cutoff scoring





Examination of the strategies used by coached malingerers may help to elucidate 
the reason why some measures are more vulnerable to coaching.  Coached simulators in 
this study endorsed poor concentration and partial memory loss as the strategies most 
frequently employed and total memory loss, nervousness, and confusion as the least 
frequently employed.  It may be that utilizing a more subtle symptom approach combined 
with the knowledge obtained through coaching allows for a malingerer to successfully 
navigate these measures undetected.  Future research should examine whether measures 
most vulnerable to coaching are less sensitive to subtle symptoms such as partial memory 
loss and poor concentration rather than to more exaggerated symptoms of complete 
memory loss or confusion.   
The findings in this study are in contrast to some of the published findings on 
malingering detection and coaching.  For example, both the PDRT and the WCMT were 
found to be invulnerable to coaching in previous studies (Rose, Hall, Szalda-Petreem, & 
Bach, 1998; Hilsabeck et al., 2001) but found to be vulnerable here.  It is likely that the 
vulnerability of detection measures varies as coaching methods vary, thus the reason for 
the dichotomy.  In research, coached instructions are standardized and based on the 
particular tests administered but this is not the case in the real-world.  Rarely are 
attorneys aware of all the detection measures included in the neuropsychological battery.  
In addition, there is likely no universally accepted coaching method among attorneys.    
Future research comparing different methods of coaching (such as teaching specific test 
failure, providing individuals with knowledge of a disorder, or coaching the participant to 




voice specific complaints) across a stable battery of detection measures will help to 
determine the contribution of coaching methods to malingering detection vulnerability.  
Overall, the findings of this study make several contributions to forensic 
neuropsychological research and practice.  One aim of this paper was to improve on the 
methodology utilized in malingering research.  Previous literature suggested that the 
inclusion of individuals with a history of head-injury would be more generalizable to 
real-world malingerers (Cato et al., 2002).  The results of this study suggest that a history 
of head-injury does not allow one to simulate symptoms more successfully.  It is possible, 
however, that the sample size utilized in this study did not allow for enough power to 
detect a difference if one existed; therefore, future research utilizing a larger sample size 
may be needed.  Furthermore, the participants with a history of head-injury utilized in 
this study were recruited from university undergraduate courses and may represent 
individuals who are functioning at a higher level compared to others with a history of 
mild head-injury.  Perhaps demographically matching educational variables to real-world 
malingerers will improve the generalizability of simulators with a history of head-injury.   
In regards to practical application, the findings of this study demonstrate that 
coaching has a significant effect on the detection success of several malingering 
measures.  A forensic neuropsychologist may be able to arm himself against this 
vulnerability.  Perhaps the ability to detect malingering can be increased by incorporating 
several, rather than just one measure of malingering.  When doing this, the 
neuropsychologist should pick measures that vary in degree of difficulty and face validity 
as a detection measure.  In this way, the neuropsychologist is more likely to present the 
patient with a measure or method in which he has not been coached.  A clinician would 




do best to build a detection battery around the malingering classification categories 
developed by Slick et al (1999).  Although several indices were found to be vulnerable to 
coaching within this study, the application of Slick et al’s (1999) classification categories 
detected probable or definite malingering in 100% of the coached sample.  See Figure 3.  
A clinician must use caution, however, when adding multiple measures to the battery 
because with each additional measure, the error rate is increased via alpha inflation.   
Future research outlining the relationship between multiple measures and increased error-
rate would better prepare the clinician in creating a detection battery.   




















Classification Categories of Coached and Uncoached Simulators. 





When this study was originally proposed in January 2006, a fourth hypothesis was 
included.  This hypothesis was developed in an attempt to further improve the external 
validity of the simulation design.  It was hypothesized that the inclusion of actors as 
simulating malingerers would further improve the generalizability to real-world 
malingers.  After attempting over the course of one year to recruit actors via contacting 
theater professors, posting advertisements on audition boards in and around the theater 
department, contacting various acting troupes and directors in the Baton Rouge and New 
Orleans area, creating a webpage linked to acting groups on networking websites such as 
myspace.com and facebook.com , and offering coauthorship to tenure-tracked theater 
professors, data collection was terminated (based on committee approval).  It appears that 
the difficulty in recruiting subjects says more about the hypothesis than data analysis 
could.  Because recruiting actors is so extremely difficult, including them in a study could 
actually lessen the external validity (by increasing the likelihood of invalid collection 
procedures and biased sampling) and thus reduce the generalizability to real-world 
malingerers.   
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Structured Clinical Interview 
 
Subject #:______    Examiner:____________________ 
 
Age: _________     Drama  Psychology 
                             
Race: ________     Coached  Uncoached 
 
Gender: _______     Head-Injury  No Head-
Injury 
 
Highest grade completed: ________ 
 
Do you currently, or have you previously, had any type of neurological disorder, 







Have you ever been hit on the head so hard that you blacked out?  If so please 




_______________________________________________________           
 
LOC = ___________    PTA = _____________ 
 





__________________________________________________________________                      
 
Have you ever worked or volunteered as an actor in any capacity? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 






Portland Digit Recognition Test 
 




 Easy – 5” Easy – 15” Hard – 30” Hard - 30” 
1.    71394     
2.    27586     
3.    58192     
4.     38295     
5.    72819     
6.    94376     
7.    56392     
8.    82193     
9.    81293     
10.  47391     
11.  48526     
12.  86524     
13.  41759     
14.  74629     
15.  38295     
16.  59182     
17.  12853     
18.  28149     
Correct:             __________  __________  __________  ___________ 
 
Easy Items Correct: __________ 
Hard Items Correct: __________ 
Total Correct:          __________




 Appendix C 
 
Memory for Fifteen Items Test 
 
 





Column 1 Correct: ________ 
 
Column 2 Correct: ________ 
 
Column 3 Correct: ________ 
 
Column 4 Correct: ________ 
 
Column 5 Correct: ________ 
 
Total Correct : ____________ 





     









Card 1:  Error/No Error 
 
Card 2: Error/No Error 
 
Card 3: Error/No Error 
 
Card 4: Error/No Error  
 
Card 5: Error/No Error 
 
Card 6: Error/No Error 
 
Card 7: Error/No Error 
 
Card 8: Error/No Error 
 
Card 9: Error/No Error 
 
Card 10: Error/No Error 
 
Card 11: Error/No Error 
 




Total Number of Errors:   __________ 







Subject #:______     Examiner:___________________ 
 
Drama  Psychology 
 
Coached  Uncoached 
 
Head-Injury  No Head-Injury 
 
1.) Rank order (1-8) the following approaches from most like your 
performance to least like your  
a. ________ Total Memory Loss 
b. ________ Slow rate of responding 
c. ________ Poor Concentration 
d. ________ Confusion 
e. ________ Nervousness 
f. ________ Dyslexia 
g. ________ Partial Memory Impairment 
h. ________ Other 
 
2.) Which of these tests do you think could catch someone faking a head-
injury? 
a. ________ TOMM 
b. ________ PDRT 
c. ________ WMT 
d. ________ MFIT 
e. ________ DCT 
f. ________ WCMT 
g. ________ PAI 
h. ________ WRAT3 
 
3.) Which of these tests were the easiest to perform as if you were head-
injured? 
a. ________ TOMM 
b. ________ PDRT 
c. ________ WMT 
d. ________ MFIT 
e. ________ DCT 
f. ________ WCMT 
g. ________ PAI 
h. ________ WRAT3 





4.) Which of these tests were the most difficult to perform as if you were head-
injured? 
a. ________ TOMM 
b. ________ PDRT 
c. ________ WMT 
d. ________ MFIT 
e. ________ DCT 
f. ________ WCMT 
g. ________ PAI 
h. ________ WRAT 
 
5.) Which test was the most difficult? 
 
a. ________ TOMM 
b. ________ PDRT 
c. ________ WMT 
d. ________ MFIT 
e. ________ DCT 
f. ________ WCMT 
g. ________ PAI 
h. ________ WRAT 
 
6.) Which test was most aversive? 
 
a. ________ TOMM 
b. ________ PDRT 
c. ________ WMT 
d. ________ MFIT 
e. ________ DCT 
f. ________ WCMT 
g. ________ PAI 
h. ________ WRAT 
 


















9.) How did you prepare for this role? 
 
a. ________ Read about brain damage in a book or on the internet 
b. ________ Watched a movie about someone with brain damage 
c. ________ Spoke with someone I know who has brain-damage 
d. ________ Other:_____________________________________ 
 
 
                  
 






Subject Rating Scale 
 
 





1.)  How successful do you think you were in your attempt to portray someone 
with a brain-injury? (Circle one) 
         Not at all            Very 
               
              0          1        2      3       4        5 
       




2.)  How hard did you try?  (Circle one) 
        Not at all             Very 
            
              0          1        2      3       4        5 











Louisiana State University 
236 Audubon Hall 
Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5501 
(225) 578-1494 Phone - (225) 578-4661 Fax 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.  Study Title: 
  The Vulnerability of Coaching Across Measures of Malingering 
 
2.  Performance Site: 
 Louisiana State University 
 
3.  Investigators: 
The investigators listed below are available to answer questions about the 
research, M - F, 8:00 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. 
 
 Wm. Drew Gouvier, Ph.D. & Adrianne Brennan, M.A. 
 (225) 578-1494 
 
4.  Purpose of the Study: 
The purpose of this research is to determine whether different factors, such 
as internal motivation, coaching, and/or the history of a head-injury allow 
one to better portray an individual with a head-injury. 
 
5.  Subjects: 
 A.  Inclusion criteria: > 18 years old 
     Current undergraduates at LSU 
      
  
 B.  Exclusion criteria:  Neurological disease or seizure disorder 
     Present psychological disorder 
     
 C.  Maximum number of subjects: 120 
 
 
6.  Study Procedures: 
 
The experiment will take place over two sessions.  During the first session, 
the participant will be interviewed about their medical and psychological 
history and provided with directions requesting that they perform as if they 




had a head-injury.  During the second session, the participant will take 8 
tests on which they will be asked to perform as if they had a head-injury.  
Interview plus test administration should not exceed three hours. 
 
7.  Benefits: 
Each undergraduate subject will receive six (6) extra credit points for full 
participation in this three (3) hour study.  Information gained from this 
study may help us to better understand and improve current psychological 
research in the area of malingering. 
 
8.  Risks/Discomforts: 
There is no known risk associated with participation in this study above 
what might be experienced in an average day. 
 
9.  Injury/Illness: 
 To assure that subject’s privacy is respected, this study will be anonymous. 
 
10.  Right to Refuse: 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary and subjects may change 
their minds and withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. 
 
11.  Privacy: 
Subjects’ names on consent forms will not be able to be linked to interview 
and questionnaire responses.  Additionally, consent forms will be stored 
separately from data. 
 
The LSU Institutional Review Board (which oversees university research 
with human subjects) and Wm. Drew Gouvier, Ph.D. may inspect and/or 
copy the study records. 
 
Results of this study may be published, but no names or identifying 
information will be included in the publication. 
 
12.  Financial Information: 
There is no cost to the subjects.   Subjects will receive six (6) extra credit 
points. 
 
13.  Withdrawal: 
You may withdraw from this study at any time; however, extra credit points 
will not be given for less than full participation.  To withdraw, inform the 
principle investigator or research assistant of your decision. 
 
14.  Removal: 




If it becomes apparent that the subject is not responding in a forthright 
manner or additional information suggesting that a subject meets exclusion 
criteria is disclosed later in the study, the subject will be removed from the 
study without his or her consent. 
 
The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered.  I 
may direct additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigator or 
research assistants.  If I have questions about subjects’ rights or other concerns, I 
can contact Robert C. Matthews, Chairman, LSU Institutional Review Board, 
(225) 578-8692.  I agree to participate in the study described above and 




Subject Signature ____________________________________________ 
 




Witness Signature ___________________________________________ 
 
Date __________ 






 Adrianne M. Brennan was born and raised in New Orleans, Louisiana.  She 
received a Bachelor of Arts Degree with Honors in psychology from the University of 
New Orleans in 2001.  In 2004, while under the direction of Dr. Wm. Drew Gouvier, she 
was awarded a Master of Arts Degree in psychology from Louisiana State University.  
She is currently fulfilling her internship requirements at the Louisiana State University 
Health Sciences Center in New Orleans. 
     
 
